Stopping AI-powered attacksBeginnerLesson 1325 min read

Verify out of band: the callback rule

When a request is risky, check it through a different channel you already trust. Here's how to design a verification procedure people will actually use.

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In 60 seconds

Verify out of band: the callback rule

When a request is risky, check it through a different channel you already trust. Here's how to design a verification procedure people will actually use.

1/5
In simple words
If someone knocks and says "It's your uncle, open the door", you don't ask through the door "are you really my uncle?" You call your uncle's phone. If he says "I'm at home", you know who is NOT your uncle. That is checking "out of band".
Out-of-band verification means checking a request through a different channel from the one it came on, using contact details you already had. If an email asks for money, you check by phone. If a call asks for access, you check in the company chat or in person.

Why 'in band' checks fail

If you reply to the suspicious email, or call the number in the message, you are talking to whoever sent it. With AI, that person can answer convincingly in any voice and any style. The check must go somewhere the attacker can't reach.

The building blocks

  1. 1

    Define high-risk requests

    Payments, bank or payee changes, payroll changes, password or MFA resets, new access, sharing sensitive data, gift cards.
  2. 2

    Call back on a known number

    Use the company directory, your vendor records or a contract. Never a number from the request itself.
  3. 3

    Use code words for the highest risks

    Agree a phrase or question in person for very sensitive requests. Change it if it may have leaked.
  4. 4

    Two-person rule

    Payments and access changes need a second person who verifies independently.
  5. 5

    Make 'no' safe

    Anyone may pause a request to verify it, even from the boss, without blame.
  6. 6

    Record it

    Note who verified, how and when. This helps audits and investigations.
Request arrives by…Verify by…Never verify by…
EmailPhone call to the known number, or in personReplying to the email
Phone or voice noteCall back on the directory number, or message on the company chatCalling the number that called you
Video callLeave the call; phone the person on a known numberAsking people on the same call
WhatsApp or SMSCall the known number or check in personReplying in the same chat
Company chatPhone call or in person, especially for money or accessAsking in the same chat thread

Make it OK to say no to the boss

Fraud works when staff feel they can't question authority. Leaders must say, in writing and in meetings: "Our verification rule applies to me too. I will never punish you for checking." Give staff a simple script.
A polite verification scripttext
"Thank you. As per our payment policy, I verify all
such requests by calling back on the directory number.
I'll call you in five minutes."
Watch out
A rule that is too slow or complicated will be skipped when people are busy. Keep the high-risk list short, the steps simple, and the contact list up to date.
Do this
A good verification rule makes the attacker's best tools (perfect writing, cloned voice, fake video) useless, because none of them can answer a call to the real person's real number.
Try this. Check that you can find, in under one minute, the real phone numbers for your manager, your finance head and your main vendor. If you can't, that's the first thing to fix.

Watch and read more

Lab

A one-page verification policy for your team, ready to share with your manager.

~30 min

The problem

Write a one-page verification policy for your team or a made-up small company. Include:

  1. Scope: a short list of high-risk requests.
  2. How to verify: which channel for each type of request, and where the known contact details are kept.
  3. Two-person rule: which actions need a second approver, and any amount threshold.
  4. Code words: whether you use them, for what, and how they are shared and changed.
  5. Leadership statement: one or two sentences from leadership saying checking is always welcome.
  6. Reporting: who to tell about a suspicious request, and how.

Then test it against one scenario: a WhatsApp voice note, in the MD's voice, asks HR to change the MD's salary bank account before today's payroll run. Mark the step where your policy stops it.

You are done when

Hard questions

Try to answer before you reveal. If you can answer these, you understood the lesson.

Q1Your policy is strong but staff skip it when busy. How would you find out, and what would you change?Reveal

Look at records: are verifications logged for every bank change? Ask staff privately what slows them down. Then simplify: shorten the high-risk list, keep contact numbers one click away, set backup approvers, and have leaders praise people who pause to check. A rule people actually follow beats a perfect rule they skip.

Q2An attacker has taken over your manager's company chat account. Which parts of your policy still protect you?Reveal

The callback to a known phone number still works, because the attacker controls the chat, not the phone. The two-person rule adds a second independent check. Code words help if they were never typed in chat. Reporting lets IT lock the account. This is why no single channel should be enough for high-risk actions.

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Questions people ask

What if the real person is travelling and can't answer the callback?

Then the request waits, or goes to a named backup approver who is verified the same way. A real urgent request can almost always wait a short time. Plan backups in advance so this doesn't create pressure.

Isn't a code word enough on its own?

No. Code words can leak, be forgotten, or be shared in chat by mistake. Use them as an extra layer for the highest-risk requests, together with callbacks and a second approver.

How do we keep the known-number list safe?

Treat it like bank details. Changes need verification and approval, and are logged. An attacker who can change the phone number on record can defeat the callback rule.

Does this apply to small amounts too?

Set a clear threshold for payments, but apply the rule to all bank-detail changes, access changes and sensitive data requests, whatever the amount. Attackers sometimes start small to build trust.

Lesson test

5 questions. Get 3 right (60%) to pass and complete this lesson.

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